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ABSTRACT This article looks at current policies concerning the civic and political 
participation of youths, women, migrants and minorities in the European Union. It highlights 
the ways in which active citizenship and civic engagement have become a political priority 
for European institutions. Representation of local policy actors at the supranational level and 
strategies for the inclusion of civil society provide a platform for evaluating the impact of 
Europeanization at the national and subnational level. The article focuses on key discourses 
and narratives associated with specific policy frames (e.g. European citizenship, European 
social policies, and the European public sphere). Some of the key questions addressed by the 
article are: What are the strategies that are employed, both by the European institutions in 
Brussels and organized civil society, to enhance participation and reciprocal 
communication? What vision of governance do practices such as active engagement and civil 
dialogue represent? Drawing on current theories of governance, our article contributes to the 
debate about the European public sphere (EPS) by evaluating the role of organized civil 
society (OCS) in bridging the gap between European institutions and national polities. 
Equally, our focus on traditionally marginal groups provides a platform for assessing the 
institutionalization of the ‘European social dimension’. 
 
KEY WORDS: Active citizenship, political participation, public sphere, civil dialogue, civil 
society 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article draws on the work of a project looking at Processes Influencing 
Democratic Ownership and Participation (PIDOP) in Europe, sponsored by the 
European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme. In particular, it presents some of 
the findings from policy analysis that looked at the civic and political participation of 
youths, women, migrants and minorities in Europe. The article reflects upon the most 
recent attempts of the European Union (EU) to reinvigorate the basis of participatory 
democracy at every level of European governance. Our central argument is that active 
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citizenship has become an increasingly central area of policy for European institutions 
as a vehicle for facilitating the development of a European public sphere (EPS). Our 
main aim here is to outline the drivers of this process and unpack the factors that – at 
the level of the EU – have determined this shift in political discourse. The article 
draws on policy analysis to explain the emergence of this new political discourse at 
the European level between 2005 and 2010.  
The democratic crisis triggered by the rejection of the European Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 provided an opportunity to make active citizenship a concrete policy 
area/objective (Kingdon, 2011). Despite the criticisms of the European Commission’s 
efforts to reinvigorate the democratic basis of the EU, WallströmWallstrom’s 2005 
initiative is worthy of notice1. Her approach is based on a wide set of programmes 
(e.g. Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate) aimed at promoting a citizens’-
orientated form of European integration (Commission of the European Community - 
CEC, 2005). This strategy is prevalent in institutional discourse and was recently 
introduced in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU Treaties under Article 11 of 
Lisbon. It seeks to establish a wider basis for the participation and engagement of 
stakeholders’ networks, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the activists that 
form the core of European civil society. Issues such as active citizenship, 
representation of local policy actors at the supranational level, strategies for civic 
engagement and empowerment of civil society organizations become benchmarks for 
evaluating the impact of Europeanization at the national and local level. It is worth 
noting that these principles are also at the heart of ‘Europe 2020’, a political strategy 
based upon advocacy and network building.  
This article explores some of the challenges entrenched in the study of civil 
society engagement and interest representation in Europe. Our analysis is first and 
foremost interested in understanding the interaction between dominant policy 
discourses (coming mainly from, e.g., the European institutions and policy actors) and 
the emergence of counter narratives (from, e.g., civil society organizations) at the 
national and European level. The approach adopted by this article is discursive in 
nature, but it is also sensitive to the importance of content and context. We locate our 
discussion of the development of organized civil society (OCS) in Europe within the 
context of current debates about democratic accountability and the establishment of a 
European public sphere (EPS). Positioned at the interfaced between national and 
European politics, civil society organizations play a key role in promoting political 
engagement. The increased interest in OCS at the European level also indicates 
recognition of the role these organizations play in promoting the project within 
national communities. The analysis presented in the empirical section of this article 
highlights strengths and weaknesses of this political strategy for enhancing 
democratic ownership of the European project. The development of active citizenship 
– both as a coherent policy area and as a vehicle for increasing the engagement of 
traditionally marginal groups – provides useful insights into institutional strategies for 
dealing with the crisis of Europe and the rise of popular opposition to the European 
project.  
Our article thus looks at four issues: 1) Institutional and non-institutional 
strategies for enhancing participation and reciprocal communication; 2) Plans for 
enhancing the reach of these strategies; 3) Implications of active engagement and civil 
dialogue for democratic governance in Europe; 4) Opportunities and constraints 
entrenched in these practices.  
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Understanding Civic Engagement and Participation: Methodological 
Considerations 
 
Our approach to policy analysis produces a form of policy tracing, not dissimilar to 
the work conducted by the MAGEEQ project (Verloo, 2005). We are foremost 
concerned with how values and norms play a role in the construction of the agenda 
and the mechanisms for involving different institutional and non-institutional policy 
actors. We developed a model of discourse analysis that integrates insights from post-
structuralism as well as critical discourse analysis. In regards to the former, we looked 
at the importance of power relations in framing the interactions between various 
policy actors and their competition to shape meaning on specific policy concepts that 
become discursive nodal points (DNPs). In regards to the latter, we looked at the 
importance of political context in shaping DNPs, and in orientating the political 
strategies of public institutions.  
The development of a networked territorial space is a consequence of the 
current processes of transnationalization. Social constructivists have claimed that it 
was necessary to find ways to unpack the EU’s transformative effect on social 
realities (Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener, 1999). This can be achieved by looking 
at the dynamics and discursive interactions between constellations of strong, 
transnational and weak publics. These networks contribute to the transformation of 
identities, cognitive schemas and structures of meanings for individuals. In turn, this 
process does not entail a passive adaptation to the forces of Europeanization, but 
instead interacts with conflictual and fragmented structures.  
Discourse analysis is increasingly being adopted by social scientists as a 
useful tool for understanding the complexities of social and political structures (Diez, 
2001; Dryzek, 2008; Howart & Torfing, 2005). This approach looks at the role of 
language and communications in shaping the social world and, in turn, influencing the 
formulation of social policies. As Hajer argued, ’[D]iscourse is defined as an 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to 
phenomena. Meaning is thus produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of 
practices’” (Hajer, 2002, p. 63 ). For the purpose of this article, discourse analysis is a 
useful tool as it looks at the interaction between different publics, the reciprocal 
dynamics of power and the establishment of specific argumentative strategies 
formulated to impose a certain meaning on social reality (Liebert, 2007).  
There is a growing body of literature on governance that is gradually replacing 
‘state centric’ approaches to public policy analysis. These new approaches take into 
account new sites, actors, and themes in the development of key policies and their 
objectives. In referring to Castells’s thinking on the network society, Hajer and 
Wagenar (2003) emphasize a shift in the language from ‘institutions to networks’, 
underlining the complexity of policy making which is increasingly framed by a wide 
set of competing social actors vying for a voice in the public arena. In these terms, 
discursive approaches require an understanding of the structures of power and 
systems of meaning prevailing at the different levels of the EU as a system of 
governance (Ingram & Schneider, 2008). This approach is particularly useful for the 
analysis presented here as it allows us to assess how institutional and non-institutional 
discourses compete to shape meaning of European democratic governance.  
A central question in discourse analysis is therefore the issue of power. 
Unpacking how power is articulated and manipulated is essential to understand the 
following: first, who imposes specific meanings on social realities; and second, who 
participates (or not) in framing public discourses. In fact, different, and often 
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competing, discourses are articulated at the same time, challenging each other and 
often overlapping each other. From the position of the policy analyst, discourse 
analysis aims to understand why particular meanings become dominant and 
authoritative, while others are discredited. Diez (2001) refers to Europe as a 
‘discursive battleground’, to represent the idea of the different and simultaneous 
struggles for shaping meaning on public discourses related to key concepts such as 
governance, citizenship, public sphere, identity etc. From his position, DNPs are 
‘central concepts in the political debate around which meaning is stabilized’ (Diez, 
2001, p. 16), whose meanings are fixed by a set of discursive practices and 
metanarratives through articulation (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
 
-----------------------INSERT Figure 1 HERE----------------------------- 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, DNPs are defined in our approach by a combination of 
variables such as context, policy priorities and meta-narratives. We argue that active 
citizenship as a European Commission-sponsored policy is introduced into the agenda 
because of the combination of four DNPs: 1) Democratization and public sphere; 2) 
Europeanization and transnationalization; 3) Political participation and civil dialogue; 
and 4) European social dimension. The discursive bargaining that takes place between 
a number of institutional and non-institutional actors in order to shape meaning – thus 
the DNPs – provides useful insights on convergence as well as fragmentation in the 
agenda-setting mechanisms at EU level. We argue that this process is best explained 
by focusing our discussion on the development of the European public sphere and the 
role played by civil society organizations in its constitution.  
 
 
European Identity, Civil Society and Public Communication Management: 
Constructing the Public Sphere 
 
The normative debate about the European public sphere (EPS) concentrates on 
whether this is a feasible reality at the European level. There is agreement in the 
literature that the existence of a public sphere is important because it entails 
discussion, interaction and the development of discourses on questions of public 
concern (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000; 2002). It is a social construct that drives 
democratization and at the same time, as some critics of the Habermasian model 
(1989) argued (see for instance Fraser, 1992; 1995), it entails confrontation and 
fragmentation between dominant discourses and counter-discourses produced by 
different social actors, such as ethnic minorities (Schulz-Forberg, 2010).  
According to Calhoun (2003), the development of a ‘properly’ European 
public sphere is important because it enhances the base for participatory democracy, 
something seen as necessary to address broader issues of democratic deficit and 
legitimacy (Bellamy & Castiglione, 20001; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007). The 
absence of a truly European public sphere is thus considered to reflect a lack of 
public support for the project as a whole. It is perhaps worth underlining here that the 
debate on the development of the EPS ran parallel to the famous confrontation 
between Habermas (1995) and Grimm (1995) that generated a new body of 
scholarship looking at the development of a transnational public sphere. More 
specifically, it looks at issues such as the Europeanization of the media, political 
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communication, and the framing of European public opinion (Díez-Medrano, 2003; 
Statham, 2007; Trenz, 2010). 
It is also worth noting the potential impact of a European political space on 
shaping the social imaginary, which results from improving dialogic communicative 
practices in the EU. As a result of this process and ‘sponsorship’, the European 
imagined community is to be conceived of as a top-down – and elite-centred/driven – 
construction (Shore, 2000; Guerrina, 2002). It is not by chance that policy makers and 
eurocrats have concentrated on identifying agents of European consciousness; these 
are the actors that will advance/promote the development of the EPS and European 
identity more generally (Bee, 2010).  
The process of constructing a European identity therefore requires the 
establishment of a social imaginary linked to a sense of Europeanness. A key 
requirement for the success of this process is the establishment of awareness-raising 
mechanisms designed to highlight the benefits of the European integration process. 
European institutions funded a range of programmes aimed at developing 
transnational social spaces with a European dimension, thus hoping to develop the 
collective imaginary required for the construction of a common identity. It is worth 
remembering the large set of EU-funded initiatives that enhance ties between different 
groups or collectivities (e.g. cities, regions and municipalities) in the fields of cultural, 
educational and social policies. Research on European cities of culture has highlighted 
how transforming urban spaces can influence the development of a transnational 
reality with clear European connotations (Sassatelli, 2009). 
The main concern of this debate revolves around the social dimension of the 
European project. Clearly, civil society has a key role to play in fostering the 
development of a sense of solidarity at the European level. Calhoun (2002) 
understands the public sphere as a form of social solidarity, which is discursively 
produced and reproduced by the exchange between citizens and institutions. Pivotal in 
this process is the ability to foster the development of a social imaginary based on a 
shared sense of belonging to a territorial, cultural and political space. Key actors in 
this process are non-state actors promoting equality and social inclusion at the 
European level (Ruzza, 2004). It is in this context that we can see how the 
development of a ‘properly’ European public sphere is essential for mutual 
recognition and social cohesion.  
Clearly this debate provides the backdrop against which European policy 
actors – both institutional and non-institutional – can maximize opportunities for 
influencing the policy process. In this context, questions about feasibility and 
‘reproducibility’ of state-centric models of public sphere have become more poignant 
(Harrison & Wessels, 2009; Schlesinger, 1999; Van de Steeg, 2002). The absence of a 
common media, shared language, and shared political culture works against the 
establishment of a homogenous EPS. The presence of wide-reaching interest 
representation at the European level through an eclectic civil society is often seen as a 
disadvantage (Bellamy, 2010; Scharpf, 1998). Focusing predominantly on the national 
polity as the locus of citizenship practice, these arguments neglect, or dismiss, the 
existence of a pan-European public sphere. Eriksen accepts that a nationally bound 
public sphere is no longer feasible, but argues that ‘the European public space is 
currently fragmented, differentiated and in flux’ (2004, p. 18).  
Policy networks, new social media and civil society organizations are drivers 
in the constitution of a networked public sphere based on discursive interactions. By 
the very nature of the actors involved, these interactions are taking place at different 
levels of European governance. They have different capacity for influence and 
Commented [R7]: Here either too many words, or too few. 
 
CB I hope it is clearer now 
  
exchange at the European level; however, they come together to give meaning to a 
European social reality in what Diez (2001) calls the ‘European Discursive 
Battleground’.  
The development of a system of networked governance is shaped by the 
process of Europeanization that allows for transnational interactions and exchange. 
What emerges is a complex picture, not like Castells’s (1996) vision that the EU is a 
networked society, but more closely aligned with Schlesinger and Kevin’s (2000, p. 
217-218) model of multilevel governance. They claim that a better – more realistic – 
way of applying the concept of public sphere to the EU is by taking into account the 
interactions of the multiple publics and actors at work within this transnational polity. 
Schlesinger (2003) goes on to explain how these different actors and polities act 
inside the European communicative space. He deduces that this space is increasingly 
constituted by networks in which different actors interact and exchange information 
(cf. Koopmans & Pfetsch, 2003; Trenz & Eder, 2004). The interaction – often 
competition – between transnational and national interests shapes how power is 
allocated in the development of the EPS. The institutional structure of the EU 
reinforces the development of strong and weak publics that are often oriented towards 
representing the interest of national polities (Schlesinger, 2003, p. 1). In this context, 
the EU could be understood to be a body charged with the development of a social 
communication platform designed to connect different spheres and polities 
(Schlesinger, 2003, p. 4). As it will be shown in the rest of this article, this process is 
not linear but implies the production of fragmented and often opposing discourses. 
Civil society organizations have a significant role to play in helping European 
institutions in the process of identity building. Through this process they become the 
vehicle through which the EPS is created – thus contributing to the dissemination of 
the dominant, institutionally based discourse – as well as being the actors responsible 
for the formulation of counter-narratives.    
 
 
Actors in the EPS: The Role of the Organized Civil Society (OCS) 
 
The extensive body of literature on European civil society concentrates on 
institutional dynamics and structures. Of particular interest to the analysis presented 
here are those projects looking at political socialization and institutional cultures 
(Warleigh, 2001) and the Europeanization of civil society (Ruzza & Bozzini, 2008). 
The interplay between institutional and non-institutional actors at the European level 
has also been of particular interest to scholars looking at the changing nature and role 
of civil society in Europe. The analysis of lobbying practices in and towards Brussels 
is particularly useful in understanding the context within which organized civil 
society (OCS) operates (Coen, 2007; Greenwood, 2007; Sanchez-Salgado, 2007).  
Organized civil society can be defined as that group of non-stateinstitutional 
actors which have a direct and formalized relationship with European institutions. It 
includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, advocacy 
groups, charities, representatives of self-help organizations and promotional groups 
(Ruzza, 2004). The power of these organizations has grown considerably in the 
networked system that is the EU (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007; Smismans, 2006), 
where power is dispersed along different nodes and governance structures that are no 
longer bounded by state sovereignty (Warleigh, 2001).  
This process, however, has generated two competing spheres. On the one hand 
there are highly institutionalized civil society organizations that work within formal 
Commented [R8]: Not in References. 
 
CB ADDED 
Commented [R9]: I’ve wondered the whole time what you mean 
by ‘non-institutional’. Why are civil society organizations ‘non-
institutional’? Many definitions of CSOs call for them to be 
‘institutionalized’. Do you mean not part of the European Union 
apparatus? 
 
 
CB I will subsitute non institutional actors with the term non state 
actors to avoid confusion 
  
structures and networks as discussed above. On the other hand, a number of critical 
forces, such as social movements, have started to emerge. These new social actors use 
the EPS in a way that is more fluid and non-institutionally bound. It is the latter group 
that is increasingly responsible for producing a critique of Europeanization (Della 
Porta, 2009). The development of transnational protest and interactive practices in 
arenas such as the European Social Forum are prime examples of civil society 
organizations producing counter-narratives and alternatives to institutional practices 
(Balme & Chabanet, 2008; Saunders, et al., 2009). The distinction between types of 
civil society organization is important here because it helps us to understand how they 
facilitate – or not – the establishment of a European polity. If we assume that OCS is 
key to the development of the EPS, then understanding its interaction – however 
complex – with institutional structures is essential to explain how it facilitates 
ownership and engagement amongst traditionally marginal groups.  
More specifically, by conceptualizing the fragmentation of the EPS in 
networks, discourses and spheres of publics we can look at distinct claims about how 
interests are represented at different levels of European governance. The 
asymmetrical influence also exercised by different groups over policy-making 
processes also helps us to understand how power manifests itself within network 
governance. As we have already established the EPS is a top-down, elite-driven 
process; it is thus worth remembering that, over time the EU has sought to address 
such concerns by developing an approach to public communication that involves 
social actors (such as the civil society and the media) as well the general public.  
The White Paper on Communication (CEC, 2006) and Plan D (CEC, 2005) 
represent a critical junction for the way European institutions manage this process. 
Firstly, these policies enhanced the EU’s capacity to communicate about transnational 
issues. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, they also transformed public 
campaigning from an activity into a public policy. They sanctioned a formal budget 
for this policy area and defined specific priorities and spheres of intervention. We can 
easily find examples of how these policies have been implemented by looking at the 
main EU communication campaigns of the last five years, e.g. social communication 
on ‘sensitive issues’, like health, global warming, the environment, antidiscrimination 
and gender equality At the same time, European institutions have also sought out the 
involvement of non-state actors in the development and execution of the actual 
campaigns. This model is known in public communication theory as the ‘symmetrical 
model of public relations’ (Fawkes, 2004; Grunig & Grunig, 1992). In a nutshell, it is 
based on the enhancement of mutual, interactive and dialogic relationships between 
institutional and non-institutional actors in constructing the public discourse on issues 
of public interest.  
It is worth noting that institutional communication is a public relations activity 
and a way of producing public communication. It can be defined as a set of activities 
organized by institutional actors on questions of public concern, which entails several 
closely aligned elements. Firstly, institutions have an agenda setting role to play, in as 
far as they need to decide what needs to be communicated. Secondly, the institutions 
need to enable interaction between citizens and policy makers. Thirdly, there have to 
be opportunities for feedback on policy proposal interventions organized by public 
bodies. Finally, citizens have to be able to influence and change institutional activities 
throughout feedback process. The basic assumption that underpins this process is that 
a fully democratic political system must find a way to develop open and accessible 
communication tools.  
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------------------INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE--------------------- 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the interactions between public institutions, citizens and 
‘mediators’ in what is a bidirectional model of communication (Mancini, 2003). 
Public institutions produce outputs on questions of public concern that target sectors 
of public opinion and/or specific target groups. In this model, communication is 
achieved through the exchange between citizens and public institutions whereby the 
citizens – or specific targets groups – contribute by providing input into the process in 
order to redirect or stabilize public policies. The discursive battleground is located at 
the interface between institutionally sponsored public information campaigns – i.e. 
top-down – and citizens/civil society – i.e. bottom-up – responses to the policy 
process. This model implies some kind of discursive encounter or struggle to 
legitimize the process. As such, it is most effective when bottom-up inputs reach 
policy makers, thus signalling participation and representation. The model therefore 
hinges upon the ability of the ‘mediators’ – i.e. civil society organizations – to engage 
with the public institutions; the pressure they levy on these public institutions and the 
way they represent citizens’ interests ultimately shape the scope and reach of the final 
policy outcomes. The idea of active citizenship becomes particularly relevant in this 
discussion, in as far as it allows citizens to engage directly with policy makers, and 
without the intervention of mediators, for the pursuit of a common interest. Our article 
focuses specifically on the bottom-up responses to official policy documents and 
public information campaigns. It therefore looks at the effectiveness of OCS as a 
moderator in the process and a vehicle for citizens’ participation and representation. 
The work carried out by the PIDOP project, particularly in the context of 
understanding current policy approaches to improving political participation and 
engagement, shows that application of this ideal model of institutional communication 
at the European level is challenged by various factors, above all, the complexity of 
European governance, the dispersion of power between different levels and the 
existence of strong, transnational and weak publics. These variables ultimately 
contribute to the creation of multiple polities with unbalanced access to European 
institutions. Our analysis shows that the development of a mutual, transparent, 
symmetrical and bidirectional model of institutional communication favours 
interactions between strong and transnational publics, at the expense of weak public 
spheres. Awareness of the biases at the heart of European communication policy and 
its application to active citizenship therefore calls for a detailed analysis of the impact 
these processes have on the establishment of active citizenship at the European level.  
 
 
Active Citizenship in the EU: Unpacking the Discourse 
Our projectThe PIDOP project focused on key policy development in the area of 
active citizenship and participation at the European level between 2004 and 2010. We 
have been particularly interested in how these policy trends shaped the political 
agenda of the organization as a wholeEuropean Commission and how OCS responded 
to institutional efforts to increase political participation and representation of 
traditionally marginal groups.  
The EU has always been a magnet for wide range of civil society 
organizations seeking to lobby and influence European institutions. The very nature of 
European governance encouraged the participation of organized civil society in a 
supranational setting. Umbrella organizations – e.g. Social Platform, CONCORD, the 
European Youth Forum, and the European Women’s Lobby – act as catalyst for the 
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engagement of a wide range of social interests at the European level. They have a 
privileged position in the Brussels arena and thus they are an example of a strong 
public looking to represent the interests of transnational organizations connected with 
them. However, questions need to be asked about their own accountability and how 
effective they are at representing weaker publics such as NGOs, associations and 
organizations that operate at the sub-national levels. Concentration of power and 
access in the hand of strong transnational umbrella organizations ultimately reduces 
the opportunities for weaker groups to influence public policies and to make their 
voices heard at the European level. This asymmetrical structure challenges a core 
assumption at the heart of European approaches to active citizenship, i.e. that OCS 
can and/or should act as legitimizing force for the EU.  
This section will unpack this complex set of interactions, thus contributing to 
current debates about governance, legitimacy and democracy in Europe. The section 
will focus on European OCS in an attempt to assess how the extent to which these 
groups have become institutionalized and therefore agents of European political 
communication, as opposed to active representatives of a counter-discourse.  
Our analysis concentrates on the range, scope and depth of interactions 
between OCS and the European Commission in order to uncover these organizations’ 
influence on the development of the European policy agenda. In order to account for 
the asymmetrical development of structures for active citizenship, we selected a 
number of policy documents produced by the European Commission in the period 
2004-2010. The large number of public campaigns initiated by the Commission in the 
period between 2004-2010 is a direct consequence of Plan D and the White Paper on 
Communication Policy. These campaigns are particularly relevant for the PIDOP 
project because of their focus on minority rights, social exclusion, anti-discrimination, 
poverty, intercultural dialogue, equality, and similar topics. The intention is to unpack 
the direction of travel or trajectory of European strategies for civil society engagement 
during the Barroso I presidency. In keeping with the focus of the PIDOP project, we 
concentrated on three categories of citizens (i.e. youth, women,  and migrants and 
minorities). Four DNPs emerged from the wider European political context and the 
analysis of these documents. These DNPs are significant for our discussion as they 
frame European institutional discourse on political participation and civic 
engagement. The next step in our research was to select and analyse an equal number 
of policy documents produced by supranational umbrella civil society organizations, 
e.g. the European Youth Forum, the European Women Lobby, the Social Platform, 
Concord, Euractiv, Enar and Solidar2.  
Our sample was then examined to assess the development of policy narratives 
around the concept of active citizenship, which is the main analytical frame for this 
article. The analysis to follow therefore looks at the development of active citizenship, 
as it is linked to four key discursive nodal points (DNPs) (see table 1 below). The 
article thus sets out how active citizenship was introduced as a policy objective and 
how it relates to specific policy actions (e.g. policy programmes such as Youth in 
Action or legislative instruments such as Art. 11 of the Lisbon Treaty). 
 
 
-------------------------------INSERT TABLE 1 HERE--------------------------------- 
 
Four DNPs emerge as dominant, each supported by various meta-narratives - 
e.g. European identity, future Europe, and euro-crisis. The specific political context 
that characterized European integration between 2004 and 2010 – e.g. the rejection of 
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the Constitutional Treaty, enlargement, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
publication of Europe 2020, etc. – defines these narratives and discourses by 
promoting specific political priorities, such as the development of an open and 
transparent EU based on the participation of civil society. The rest of this article will 
look at how OCS responded to institutional discourses on active citizenship and 
whether it was successful in advancing a counter-discourse. The analysis is 
particularly insightful as it provides evidence of the range and scope of critiques 
advanced by umbrella organizations in Brussels. The focus of these counter-
discourses is specific policy initiatives aimed at improving active citizenship and civic 
engagement. Overall, it traces how the DNPs become sites of contestation for non-
institutional state actors. When taken together the meta-narratives produced by the 
OCS in relation to the DNPs challenge dominant discourses on active citizenship 
proposed by the European Commission.   
 
 
Democratization and Public Sphere 
 
The European Commission’s response to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 indicates institutional recognition of the need to improve the democratic 
foundations of the European project. From this point the Commission makes a 
concerted effort to enhance the basis of participatory democracy at the European level 
by increasing opportunities for interaction and exchange with the ‘public’. This 
approach is also an attempt to develop a bidirectional model of public communication 
that feeds into the Commission’s understanding of public sphere and governance.  
It is important to unpack the Commission’s strategy for dealing with one of 
the most significant challenges faced by the EU: popular rejection of the project. In 
response to the challenge laid down by emerging social forces, the Commission put 
forward a number of meta-narratives aimed at ‘fixing’ those dimensions of the EPS 
deemed to be undermining key institutional objectives. It adopted a set of 
argumentative strategies aimed at imposing a dominant discourse on the EPS. This 
process allows the Commission to take ownership of the concept – so that it becomes 
the EU’s public sphere – thus stabilizing its meaning. This top-down process of 
construction of meaning is challenged by a wide set of counter publics that generate 
meta-narratives that challenge the very notion of an EU-dominated EPS. The 
productive exchange between institutional – i.e. dominant – narratives and non-
institutional discourses can be seen as a battle to establish meaning.   
From this perspective the EPS is fluid and subject to discursive mediation, i.e. 
its meaning is not fixed and the subject will only stabilize when another dominant 
discourse emerges. It is worth noting that European civil society has widely 
challenged the notion of the public sphere proposed by the European Commission. 
Cited below is an example of counter-discourse offered by EurActiv (2006) after the 
publication of Plan D (CEC, 2005). EurActiv’s Plan D: Diversify, Decentralise, 
Disseminate, Decide (EurActiv, 2006), challenges the Commission’s vision of a 
homogeneous public sphere. In particular, EurActiv’s argues for the establishment of 
a networked and decentralized approach: 
 
The European public sphere is certainly desirable, given what some call the 
federalist vocation of the EU. But is it achievable within a reasonable time? 
(…) Rather, are there not multiple public spheres, fragmented by national and 
socio-professional canters of interest? If so, one should privilege 
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interconnection of national spheres/benchmarking (…) rather than trying to 
create one European public sphere. (EurActiv, 2006, p. 5) 
 
The interpretation of this ‘struggle’ to impose meaning on the concept of public 
sphere has to be understood in light of two other DNPs: 1. Europeanization and 
transnationalization; and 2. Political participation and civil dialogue. EurActiv’s 
position focuses on diffusion of leadership and power as a route to promote 
democratic governance at the European level.  
EurActiv’s meta-narrative is driven by an overarching aim to account for the 
role of transnationalization in the construction of the EPS. This position is intended to 
challenge the definition of the EU’s public sphere as defined – or fixed – by the 
European Commission. In order to resist the discursive underpinning of the official 
narrative (DNP), EurActiv’s articulation of a counter-discourse must be accompanied 
by specific mechanisms (e.g. civil dialogue) that guarantee open interplay (i.e. public 
communication) between institutional and non-institutional actors. It is worth noting 
here that the European Commission has substantially increased the opportunities for 
civil organizations to provide input into the policy making process. Open 
consultations on public policies are now fairly common practice and have greatly 
enhanced the ability of ‘counter publics’ to influence and change the meaning of a 
DNP (Bozzini, 2007). There are two defining features to this process of engagement 
that ultimately impact upon the quality of interest representation at the European 
level. Firstly, consultation is now an intrinsic part of the EU’s communication 
strategy. Secondly, official communications and consultations are largely directed at 
strong and transnational publics.  
Debates about the most appropriate ways of communicating to marginal 
groups in order to enhance ownership and participation at the European level is a 
recurrent concern of many policy documents we analysed. This process of 
contestation highlights the OCS’s perceived ambiguity in the development of the EPS. 
It also points to an increased fragmentation and contestation of the vision put 
forwards by the European Commission.  
Despite increased recognition that the EU can be a catalyst for change in 
social matters, there is also a sense that it has to compete with other – perhaps more 
powerful – sources of information. Take for instance the representation of minority 
groups in the media; European public discourse on equality and diversity is in direct 
competition with sources of information that are more accessible by the public. The 
limited reach of the EPS and its competition with national political narratives 
ultimately undermine the effectiveness of European policy initiatives. The European 
Network Against Racisms (ENAR) assessment of EU project to fight racism 
highlights this tension:  
 
Many ethnic and religious minority groups have been affected by public 
perception and the negative debate on migration. The negative portrayal of 
migration by policy makers and by the mass media through stereotypical 
language and negative images has led to a worrying increase in racism and 
xenophobia towards third country nationals. (ENAR, 2008, p. 1) 
 
In this extract, ENAR identifies public representation of minorities by the media and 
some sections of the political sphere as one of the drivers for social exclusion and 
discrimination in Europe. The organization considers it to foster stereotypes of the 
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strong public sphere (i.e. the majority groups) towards the weak one (i.e. minorities). 
On this account the organization in fact remarks that:   
 
The media continues to have a major influence on the perceptions of minority 
communities. […] The conspicuous lack of minority representation in all 
forms of media also creates a misperception, especially when the only 
representation is negative stories and stereotypes. News stories will often 
identify the ethnicity or origin of those perpetrators who are foreign or belong 
to a minority community, in contrast to when a member of the majority 
population commits a crime. (ENAR, 2010, p. 12) 
 
Together these extracts highlight some of the recurring themes associated with current 
debates about transparency and accountability at the European level. They also stress 
the challenges entrenched within an asymmetrical communication structure whereby 
European public institutions are reliant on Member States and civil society 
organizations for dissemination and engagement. Lack of a European media and/or 
meaningful engagement with transnational issues is the main problem for the 
establishment of a European political space. On this account, we can thus underline 
the emergence of a number of challenging issues that are put forward by the OCS in 
answer to the European Commission’s project to shape the EPS.  
 
 
Europeanization and Transnationalization 
 
Focusing on European-level discourse highlights the increasing centrality of the 
processes of Europeanization and transnationalization. The relationship between 
national and European NGOs is a recurrent theme that emerges from the analysis of 
civil society documents. The asymmetrical relationship between these two levels and 
the ability of the latter to represent the interest of national groups has been a central 
point of discussion. Weaker groups’ exclusion from strong European networks 
reduces their capacity to influence public policies. The power of European level OCS 
to act as gatekeeper needs to be recognized, if issues of legitimacy and representation 
are to be addressed in a meaningful way. This consideration is true of all OCS, but it 
is particularly important in relation to traditionally marginal groups as it defines the 
parameters for membership.  
The process of Europeanization is not linear. Rather, it is fragmented both 
vertically (EU to member states) and horizontally (member state to member state). 
The way that this process affects civil society organizations is interesting because it 
highlights the complex web of interactions and tensions at the heart of European 
governance.  
Civil society organizations thus serve a dual function. They are both a source 
of legitimacy for institutional meta-narratives, as well as the main source of 
opposition to dominant discourses. The organizations included in our analytical 
sample accept the values, policy objectives and political priorities identified by 
European institutions. In this context, they therefore legitimize the four DNPs 
emerging at the European level. At the same time, they distance themselves from 
institutional the Commission’s narratives by not engaging with the objectives of 
specific European programmes or core principles relative to the European integration 
process. It is interesting to note that reference to core policy meta-narratives 
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addressed at the supranational level (e.g. constitutionalism or identity) rarely make an 
appearance.  
Institutional European Commission’s attempts to bring civil organizations 
‘into the fold’ are increasingly the object of reflection and critique. For example in 
December 2008, Social Platform launched an annual conference on Civil Dialogue - 
How can we shape the Europe we want? Hard to reach communities across Europe 
were the subject of much debate. Empowerment, improvement of information flows 
at the local level, enhancement of education and opportunities for communities are 
some of the key tasks transnational NGOs agreed to take on (Social Platform, 2008). 
This response sought to address concerns about the inclusiveness and representation 
of European level civil society organizations. It is also a good example of the bottom-
up dynamics started by grassroots organizations to demand better representation in 
policy processes.   
The socio-economic conditions of specific groups influence access to power 
and decision-making mechanisms. This is true at the national level, but it is an even 
more poignant consideration when thinking about European governance. The 
complexity of European processes increases the distance between policy actors and 
citizens. This is particularly true of traditionally marginal groups that rely on civil 
society organizations for interest representation and access to political institutions. 
The European Youth Forum’s (EYF) narrative reflects these concerns. When looking 
at the integration of ‘young people with fewer opportunities’, the Forum points to the 
extent to which this group is excluded from the civil dialogue and, to a large extent, 
the exercise of active citizenship. EYF is particularly critical of EU youth policy 
(Youth in Action): 
 
Young people with fewer opportunities and small youth organizations do not 
have the capacity to build the knowledge necessary to benefit from the Youth 
in Action programme and from most of the EU programmes (…). The 
European civil society should be strengthened by including a truly European 
level within the programme and a recognition of the status of European youth 
organizations who are the main channels through which young people interact 
structurally with the EU democratic process (EYF, 2010a, p. 5). 
 
EYF’s criticism concentrates on mechanisms for engagement. It highlights the crucial 
role played by OCS in facilitating access to institutional structures. EYF’s work on 
strengthening transnational cooperation provides evidence of a process of 
Europeanization, whilst also highlighting the linchpin role played by OCS in 
mediating between the national and the European level. We explore this in more detail 
in Bee and Guerrina (2014) where we look at how social problems – e.g. poverty, 
racism, unemployment, discrimination, social exclusion – negatively affect the ability 
of weaker groups to participate and engage in the process of Europeanization.  
 
 
Political Participation and Civil Dialogue 
 
Brussels-based organizations have long recognized the importance of developing 
some form of civil dialogue3 and have sought to promote active citizenship as a policy 
rather than just a set of practices involving interactions between citizens, national and 
transnational organizations, and European institutions. In practice, however, national 
NGOs struggle to establish coherent patterns of representation, which ultimately 
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limits their influence at the EU level. It is worth noting that European-level civil 
society organizations have been elaborating specific dialogic instruments to facilitate 
interest representation at the supranational level.  
Our analysis of civil society statements and policy documents highlights the 
centrality of civil dialogue. This process has an enabling function in as far as it 
facilitates access to actors within the EU institutions and allows direct input in 
agenda-setting mechanisms. It guarantees transparent interplay between EU 
institutional actors and NGOs and enables the exercise of active citizenship. As Social 
Platform recently stated: ‘Civil dialogue is a concrete tool to strengthen the 
relationship between public decision makers and CSOs’ (Social Platform, 2010). This 
is thus a formal instrument through which NGOs lobby, frame claims and establish a 
dialogic relationship with the policy makers. It is therefore meant to establish a 
bidirectional model of institutional communication at the European level.  
Recognition of civil dialogue as a core practice for European governance came 
with the inclusion of Art. 11 in the Lisbon Treaty, whereby: 
 
The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society. (Art. 11.2) 
 
The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties 
concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and 
transparent. (Art.11.3)  
 
Both these practices have long been a feature of EU policy making. However, 
inclusion in the Treaty provides a legal foundation; it reiterates the centrality of 
interest representation and fosters active citizenship as a core practice for the delivery 
of democratic governance at the European level. The European Network Against 
Racism (ENAR) welcomes this shift: 
 
It is not only representative democracy which will be strengthened by the text 
of the Lisbon Treaty. The explicit adoption of the principle of participatory 
democracy is an extremely important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty from the 
perspective of advocacy groups working in the field of racism and 
xenophobia. (ENAR, 2009, p. 13) 
 
Article 11 therefore provides a much needed opening for OCS to become formally 
involved in policy making processes. This is an important shift that paves the way for 
a wide range of interests and voices to find the way to the negotiating table. It also 
raises important questions about the very nature of European level OCS and interests 
represented within it. Increasing institutionalization of OCS is a clear opportunity to 
shape the policy agenda; however, it also carries the inherent danger that OCS will 
lose its critical voice.  
It is important to recognize the potential of active citizenship and civic 
engagement; however, both practices should not be seen as being fully inclusive. For 
instance, in our sample, the OCS points at a number of issues that undermine the 
effectiveness of civil dialogue. A recurrent meta-narrative on this account points at 
the limited reach of Art. 11 in relation to weaker groups. Civil society’s demands for 
more structured forms of dialogue and for the development of a symmetrical system 
of institutional communication have yet to be completely fulfilled. What is clear from 
  
this brief discussion is that OCS does not deem Art. 11 to be sufficient to bridge the 
participation gap affecting European governance.  
In a 2010 report, the European Network Against Racism discussed 15 
Principles for framing a positive approach to migration. Lack of inclusion and 
silencing of minority groups are key concerns of the organization: 
 
The current process has been marked by a lack of dialogue and engagement 
with civil society. It is crucial that such a dialogue takes place as it is central to 
the development of a common European policy on immigration and asylum 
(…) In order to change the negative dynamic around the migration debate, the 
migrants’ voice must be heard in EU and national decision making concerning 
migration policy. (ENAR, 2010, p. 5, 11) 
  
In a similar vein, a European Youth Forum policy paper looking at the issue of Young 
People and Poverty highlights the condition of disadvantaged groups and at the 
possible policy responses in order to improve their social inclusion:  
 
Unfortunately, it needs to be said that poverty and social exclusion affect 
active citizenship, hinder participation and set barriers for volunteering. Youth 
organisations, in their daily activities often, contribute to the activation and 
empowerment of young disadvantaged people that can eventually allow them 
to break away from the vicious circle of poverty. (EYF, 2010b, p. 10) 
 
These extracts highlight two issues that are important for the analysis presented here: 
First, OCS is uniquely positioned to provide a platform for interest representation and 
inclusion.  They are the critical voice of European policy making. They serve a key 
function in articulating counter-discourses and narratives, thus providing checks and 
balances for institutional agendas. Second, the inclusion of OCS into formal processes 
allows greater influence on policy making at the agenda-setting stages; however, it 
also dilutes its ability to exercise its role as a critical voice. 
 
 
European Social Dimension  
 
What emerges from the analysis of the previous nodal points is that civil society 
organizations identified the need to develop a European social dimension as a top 
policy priority for the future. This umbrella concept allows for contestation of key 
values underpinning the process as a whole. It therefore becomes the discursive 
battleground identified by Diez (2001).  
Social policy forces institutional actorspublic institutions to address questions 
that are normative in nature and outcomes. Issues like sustainability, gender equality, 
health promotion and anti-discrimination require detailed consideration of the 
foundational values of the organizations, how key actors adopt and promote these 
values, and the limitations of specific strategies. Focus on the social dimension 
therefore provides an opening for OCS to raise questions about the applicability of the 
key institutional narratives and delivery mechanism, e.g. the Lisbon Strategy. This 
process of exchange, challenge and reframing allows both institutional actorspublic 
institutions and civil society to refine their position, aims and role within the 
European policy-making process.  
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It is important to note that a number of Brussels-based organizations advocate 
the development of a European social dimension based on the principle of equality. 
Despite the inclusion of this principle in the founding treaties, its development in 
subsequent iterations of the treaties, a large body of secondary legislation and public 
statements that place equality at the heart of the integration process, our analytical 
sample produced a number of significant criticisms of the approach adopted by the 
Commission in the implementation of this principle. For example, commenting on the 
Barroso II presidency, the European Women’s Lobby: 
 
Equality between women and men is a fundamental right and value of the 
European Union and should be central to all Commission initiatives, policies 
and programmes. It is a legal, moral and economic imperative, not a luxury to 
be addressed sporadically or only during times of prosperity. While some 
positive steps are being prepared in this area – including a new Commission 
action plan on equality between women and men which will hopefully give 
flesh and bones to commitments – so far, the Barroso II Commission’s 
performance has been disturbingly mixed, and concrete actions in favour of a 
more equal society have been few. (EWL, 2010) 
 
The EWL’s position provides a test for the Commission’s rhetoric/narrative, 
particularly when the dominant perception is that it has not been accompanied by 
substantive action. It also highlights some of the limitations of a social agenda that is 
deeply normative in nature but is operating in a political context where the polity is 
largely absent and policy makers are seen as setting the agenda for social change. 
Of particular concern to organizations like the European Women’s Lobby, the 
European Network Against Racism and the Social Platform is the issue of 
intersectionality. Mainstreaming the specific social needs and social problems 
affecting different minorities into European policies, thus becomes a top priority. The 
EWL’s contribution to the consultation on the Roadmap for Gender Equality and the 
follow-up strategy makes this position very clear:  
 
One of the related challenges has been that the gender angle is often forgotten 
in policy areas that are not seen as related to gender equality, e.g. disability, 
Roma inclusion or integration, migration and asylum, while in turn this other 
policy angle is overlooked in gender equality policies. This shows the need to 
increase policy coherence and effectively monitor gender mainstreaming in 
other policy areas while there is also a need to strengthen the intersectional 
approach in the new Strategic Action Plan (…). Without the effective 
implementation of an intersectional approach, the specific needs of some 
groups of women (…) might be overlooked in the policy areas covered by the 
Strategic Action Plan. (EWL, 2009, p. 4) 
 
This extract highlights increasing concern with the approach of European institutions 
that seem to adopt a very one-dimensional view of equality. With preferential access 
to the Commission the EWL therefore provides a very useful source of – constructive 
– critique for European political institutions. What is significant here is that these 
shortcomings remain central to gender governance despite the fact that equality 
between men and women is also one of the most developed areas of European social 
policy (Guerrina, 2005) and the EWL has a long-standing relationship with the 
European Commission and the European Parliament.   
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Remaining on the issue of anti-discrimination, the European Network Against 
Racism states its position in relation to the challenges that different minority 
communities have faced in gaining support and recognition at the European level:  
 
The only area of anti-racist work which has received specific high level 
political attention has been the particularly hostile social and economic 
conditions in which the Roma, especially in the new member states of central 
and Eastern Europe, find themselves. Consequently, the incorporation of 
equality mainstreaming, including the mainstreaming of anti-racism, in the 
Lisbon Treaty, represents a significant strengthening of the existing legal basis 
for current practices and for policy-making. (ENAR, 2009, p. 12) 
 
In this context ENAR’s work focuses on identifying the limitations of current policy 
discourse. Similar to the previous example, the role of this civil society organization 
is to act as a ‘critical friend’, working closely with institutional bodies to improve 
policy outcomes. There is little evidence, however, of how these criticisms have been 
folded into the actual policy process. ENAR and EWL also have preferential access to 
European institutions, which on the one hand provides a platform to influence directly 
the policy process but on the other positions them as the dominant voice of each 
group at the European level. 
Some policy priorities surface that require urgent attention: enhancing 
intercultural dialogue and the establishment of common antidiscrimination 
frameworks across EU and non-EU states; recognition of disadvantaged groups – e.g. 
ethnic and linguistic minorities, women and youth from minority groups – by 
guaranteeing access to education and the labour market; development of policy 
frameworks in the areas of healthy living and sustainability; and the establishment of 
concrete measures regarding social Europe.  
Given the shortcomings of the EPS, the most effective way to communicate 
with the polity is within a national framework. Key information campaigns and 
education programmes need to be established by national institutions to facilitate 
public communications on issues like gender equality, rights of minorities, 
possibilities to access the labour market, etc. The recent Euro-crisis and associated 
debates about the reach and depth of austerity are poignant examples of the 
importance of public communication and the dominance of national public spaces. 
Key drivers of social Europe, such as social solidarity and social cohesion, are 
questioned and reframed in this context. 
In thinking about the process of polity building in which the EU is currently 
engaged, the development of a European social dimension is central to the long-term 
success of the project. Yet policies coming under this broad umbrella still lack 
visibility. One obvious conclusion is that political institutions must improve public 
communication measures at the national level. This is, however, unlikely as official 
communication will inevitably fall between European and national interests. 
Improving the engagement and access of national NGOs in the supranational setting is 
likely to be a more effective strategy. Civil society organizations thus become the 
vehicle for public communication. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  
This article has looked at the role of civil society organizations in European 
governance. Our analysis highlights that organized civil society is not only a central 
actor in the European public sphere, it also plays a fundamental role in respect to 
European democratization and constitutionalism. The diverse set of interests it 
represents, or attempts to represent, widens the bases for political participation and 
representation at the European level. OCS plays a key role in shifting and 
readdressing the EU’s policy making on questions of public interest and for 
developing transnational forms of social solidarity.  
The development of a networked EU and the growth in the role and 
importance of non-state actors is strategically oriented towards the debate on the EPS. 
As explained in this article, this is constituted by a constellation of actors that 
elaborate diverging and conflicting discourses at different levels. In the European 
discursive battleground (Diez, 2001), different publics struggle to shape meanings on 
the social reality, to influence the policy making and to frame the public policies. The 
final section of this article highlights the asymmetrical nature of OCS. Brussels-based 
organizations are an expression of a strong public, representing transnational actors 
and attempting to include the sub-national and weak publics. The EPS that emerges in 
this process favours interest representation through strong civil society organizations. 
The downside of this approach is that the organizations become socialized and 
institutionalized through the exchange. The capacity of these organizations to 
formulate a counterdiscourse, thus expanding the reach of democratic governance in 
Europe, is therefore diminished. 
It has been argued that the emergence of the EPS is contextual to the 
emergence of a debate about the feasibility of a model of institutional communication. 
This ambitious project was a reaction to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 and of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. It is based on the assumption that the 
democratic deficit arises from a communication deficit. This reflects the process that 
followed the draft of the White Paper on Governance in 2001, when the European 
Commission declared that ‘the aim should be to create a trans-national “space” where 
citizens from different countries can discuss what they perceive as being the important 
challenges for the Union’ (CEC, 2001, p. 12). At that time, Eriksen (2001, p. 2) 
commented, ‘[B]by focusing on apathy and ignorance, one not only puts the blame on 
the people, but also reduces the problem to one of information – it is about lack of 
knowledge. This represents a rather superficial understanding of the causes of the 
distrust, and one which, nevertheless, remains at odds with the post-Nice-
debatefocusing on apathy and ignorance one not only puts the blame on the people, 
but reduces the problem to an information problem it is about lack of knowledge. This 
represents a rather superficial understanding of the causes offor distrust, and one that 
is at odds with the post Nice debate’. Popular rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 supports Eriksen’s criticism of the Commission’s approach. However, this time 
the Commission’s efforts to foster active citizenship must be acknowledged; they 
resulted in the drafting of public policies in areas like health, gender equality, 
environment, global warming and anti-discrimination.   
This public policy approach is based on ‘a citizen-centred strategy’. This is 
supported by the development of a Europe-wide, homogenous public sphere. 
Unfortunately, this approach suffers from a mis-conceptualization of the EPS and a 
tendency to favour national models. The strategy of the European Commission has 
not taken into account some of the main findings of current research on the EPS, e.g. 
the existence of fragmented and overlapping discourses, the fluidity of the processes 
of transnationalization, and the existence of different power structures that define 
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access to policy making and thus influence on the on the policy agenda. Ultimately, it 
disregards the diversity in European publics. The present scenario is characterized by 
the presence of a whole set of counterdiscourses going on in Brussels and entailing a 
continuous discursive confrontation between different publics in the struggle to fix a 
meaning on the practices of active citizenship.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Margot Wallström was the Vice President of the European Commission for Institutional Relations 
and Communication Strategy under the first Barroso presidency 2004-2010 
2 The documents were selected through the use of a series of key words to search in each organization’s 
database. The initial sample included 45 documents (15 per category of citizen). On the basis of their 
relevance for our research question, we then selected 18 documents (6 per category). The analysis was 
executed with the support of a protocol for the analysis of policy documents divided into seven core 
sub-categories: policy actors, policy context, policy priorities, policy debates, EU policies, European 
crisis and counter-discourse.  
3 Civil dialogue is not to be confused with social dialogue. In its 2006 report Civil Dialogue: Making it 
Work Better, the Civil Society Contact Group draws the difference between the two and argues that 
civil dialogue is ‘developed as a parallel to that of social dialogue, it refers to a wide range of 
interactions between civil society organisations and institutions rather than a clear-cut set  of practices’ 
(CSCG, 2006, p. 22). 
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